When Ethan first began building New Manchester United's scouting department, he had worried about one particular problem.
His memories would not remain perfect forever.
He knew the names of many players who, in his previous life, would eventually become stars. But as the years passed and history increasingly diverged from what he remembered, he could hardly expect himself to retain every name, every club and every stage of every player's development.
So, early on, he had written them down.
Ángel Di María.
Mesut Özil.
Thomas Müller.
And many others.
At first, the list had been little more than insurance against his own memory.
Then the scouting department became more sophisticated.
Reports arrived constantly from Europe, South America and Africa. Whenever Ethan recognised a name from his previous life, he would circle it and ask the scouts to monitor the player more closely.
That continued for years.
Without Ethan quite realising what had happened, New Manchester United's recruitment department gradually built detailed files on an entire generation of future stars.
Some had been tracked since childhood.
Others had been monitored across several clubs and countries.
To the scouts, Ethan's ability to identify them so early bordered on the extraordinary.
Villas-Boas had praised his judgement more than once.
Ethan knew the truth was considerably less mysterious.
Still, the list eventually created a problem he had never anticipated.
As Ethan withdrew from daily decision-making and gave greater authority to the football departments, particularly after the Champions League victory, New Manchester United's recruitment operation began behaving increasingly like that of a genuine European superclub.
It started accumulating young talent.
Paulo Henrique Ganso.
Neymar.
Fábio and Rafael da Silva.
Marek Hamšík.
Mamadou Sakho.
Stevan Jovetić.
Romelu Lukaku.
Steven Defour.
Anthony Annan.
Marouane Fellaini.
The names kept appearing.
Ethan first realised the scale of it when he looked through the provisional development and training lists for the new season.
Neymar was there.
So were the da Silva twins.
Ethan stopped reading.
He could not remember approving any of those signings.
That was unusual enough for him to open the club's recruitment system and trace the transactions himself.
The fees were tiny.
That explained it.
Under the new structure Ethan had approved, transfers below £5 million no longer required his personal authorisation. Provided Mourinho and the recruitment department agreed on the footballing case, the executive team could complete the deal without bringing it to the owner.
For the first time, Ethan found himself discovering major prospects after New Manchester United had already signed them.
Neymar was only thirteen.
The da Silva twins were barely older.
Moving Brazilian minors to Europe required careful handling under international transfer regulations, so the club had structured the arrangements around the permitted family-relocation provisions rather than simply moving children abroad for football.
The families relocated with them, and the club handled schooling, accommodation and welfare as part of the development plan.
The Portuguese connection also made Benfica especially useful for older South American prospects once they reached an appropriate stage of development.
Ethan stared at the list for a long time.
Years earlier, when New Manchester United were climbing through the lower divisions, he had actively chased talented young players because he knew the club could not attract established stars and might not be able to keep anyone for long.
The situation had completely reversed.
New Manchester United were European champions now.
Their academy had a reputation.
Their sports-science programme was admired.
Young players could point to Messi, Curtis, Michael Johnson and others as proof that development at Newton Heath could lead all the way to the first team.
The question was no longer whether the club could convince talented youngsters to sign.
The question was whether signing too many of them might damage their development.
A famous name from Ethan's previous life did not guarantee the same future in this one.
A player's career depended on coaching, injuries, confidence, opportunity, personality and countless other details.
One badly chosen loan could change everything.
One season spent on the wrong bench could cost years.
So far, New Manchester United had handled the process well.
Theo Walcott was developing quickly in the academy.
His pace and acceleration were exceptional, as Ethan remembered, but the difference lay in his technique.
At Newton Heath, coaches had spent enormous amounts of time improving his first touch, combination play and decision-making.
The result was a much more technically rounded player than the teenager Ethan remembered from his previous life.
Jack Rodwell and Jack Wilshere were developing just as impressively.
Davide Santon was highly regarded by Mourinho.
The loan players had prospered too.
Džeko had finished among the leading scorers in the second tier of English football.
Joe Hart had been one of the division's outstanding goalkeepers.
Micah Richards had earned a place in the Team of the Season.
Each had received real first-team football rather than simply being parked somewhere until New Manchester United decided what to do with them.
But could the club maintain that standard if the number of prospects kept increasing?
Ethan took the concern directly to Villas-Boas.
"Absolutely," Villas-Boas replied.
There was no hesitation.
By now he had become one of the most influential figures linking New Manchester United's scouting, analysis and recruitment work, and his reputation inside European football had grown rapidly.
Ethan looked unconvinced.
Villas-Boas continued.
"You established one rule from the beginning. If we sign a player, we accept responsibility for his development."
"We haven't forgotten that."
"We're not signing these players simply to own their registrations. Every one of them has a development plan."
That answer caught Ethan slightly off guard.
There was something satisfying about hearing his own philosophy returned to him years later by someone else inside the club.
Even as he stepped away from daily control, the structure he had built remained.
Still, one problem bothered him.
"They can't all develop in Manchester."
Villas-Boas looked genuinely surprised.
"Of course not."
Ethan frowned.
Villas-Boas smiled and handed him a report.
The title concerned partner clubs.
"We never intended to keep all of them at Newton Heath."
The plan had already been discussed between Villas-Boas, Mourinho, Andy Walsh, Mark Davey and the other senior football executives.
Benfica had provided the model.
"Our arrangement with Benfica has worked better than we expected," Villas-Boas explained. "Benfica benefited, the players benefited and we benefited."
"Thiago Silva needed first-team football at centre-back. Benfica needed a centre-back."
"Dani Alves needed matches at right-back. Benfica needed a right-back."
"So instead of sending players wherever somebody happened to offer a loan, we matched the player to a genuine vacancy."
That distinction mattered.
Across Europe, youth academies produced far more players than professional football could ultimately absorb.
Even strong development systems saw only a minority reach top-level senior football.
At New Manchester United, the success rate was better than most, but still nowhere near one hundred per cent.
And the number who could become first-team players for the reigning European champions was smaller again.
Messi was exceptional.
Curtis was exceptional.
Michael Johnson had a genuine chance.
That did not mean every academy graduate would follow them.
Ethan had understood that from the beginning.
It was why academic education at Newton Heath remained compulsory.
A youth player who failed his schoolwork could be removed from training or matches until his academic standards recovered.
The rule was unpopular with some teenagers.
Parents loved it.
New Manchester United could promise a family that even if their child did not become a professional footballer, he would not leave the academy at eighteen with nothing else.
That policy had become one of the strongest reasons families trusted the club.
Villas-Boas turned the page.
"The problem with traditional loans is that clubs often think only about where they can place the player."
"We want to start with what the receiving club actually needs."
"That is why the Benfica model worked."
"Thiago Silva and Alves didn't just go to Portugal. They went into positions where Benfica had a reason to use them."
"Then Benfica coached them, we monitored them, and both clubs had an interest in making sure they improved."
"In two seasons, Thiago Silva became good enough for AC Milan to pay €15 million for him."
"Alves is ready to compete for our first team."
Villas-Boas tapped the report.
"We think the model can be expanded."
"How far?"
"We've reached five-year cooperation agreements with Ajax and Genk."
That got Ethan's attention.
Ajax was one of the most famous development clubs in world football.
Genk had a smaller profile but an excellent reputation for producing young players.
Both made sense.
"The agreements aren't identical," Villas-Boas explained. "But the principle is the same."
"They get access to selected players from us, development payments, annual cooperation fees and limited access to our scouting information."
"We get reliable development environments, better monitoring, and first refusal on certain players they produce."
Ajax's situation had deteriorated financially in recent years.
Their academy and scouting operation remained exceptional, but maintaining that network was expensive.
They needed money.
They also needed players.
Genk faced a similar problem on a smaller scale.
The Belgian club had worked with New Manchester United before, particularly during Yaya Touré's development, but the relationship had faded after he left.
Their results had since declined, and the club's finances were becoming tighter.
When they saw what Benfica had gained from its partnership with New Manchester United, Genk approached Ethan's club themselves.
For Benfica, Ajax and Genk, the appeal was broader than simply borrowing players.
They received annual payments for participating in the network.
If one of New Manchester United's players developed successfully and later moved on, the partner club received compensation based partly on the player's eventual value.
They could also draw on selected elements of New Manchester United's scouting database.
For clubs without the financial resources to maintain a worldwide network of the same scale, that was enormously valuable.
Genk would serve another useful function.
Belgium offered a practical pathway for certain non-EU players who needed time to satisfy European registration and work-permit requirements.
That made the club particularly useful for African and South American prospects.
The player allocations had already begun.
Pastore, Otamendi and Di María were scheduled to go to Benfica.
Ajax would receive Marek Hamšík, Alexandre Pato, Ganso and Anthony Annan, the powerful Ghanaian defensive midfielder who had emerged through New Manchester United's African partner network.
Pato and Ganso had required particularly careful legal and family arrangements because of their age and Brazilian registration status.
New Manchester United's lawyers had structured both transfers to comply with the applicable rules before either player was placed in Europe.
The timing at Ajax was deliberate.
Rafael van der Vaart and Wesley Sneijder were both leaving for Manchester City.
The transfer had created considerable bitterness in Amsterdam.
Ajax had originally been prepared to sell Van der Vaart.
Sneijder was another matter.
According to the Ajax hierarchy, Van Gaal and Frank Arnesen had contacted both players before a full agreement existed between the clubs.
Once personal terms and promises had effectively been discussed, pressure mounted on Ajax to sell.
The departures of Ibrahimović, Van der Vaart and Sneijder in such a short period left the Dutch club weakened both competitively and financially.
Ajax needed midfield talent.
New Manchester United needed meaningful development environments for Hamšík and Ganso.
The interests aligned.
The clubs already had a strong relationship, helped by Ethan's friendship with Ajax's leadership.
A partnership became the obvious solution.
Genk's allocation was different.
New Manchester United had already secured Steven Defour for a modest fee.
They had also moved for Marouane Fellaini from Standard Liège, Stevan Jovetić from Partizan and Mamadou Sakho from France.
All four would spend time with Genk.
Ethan looked up from the report.
"You've already organised all of this?"
Villas-Boas nodded.
"And more."
He explained that New Manchester United had already sent technical staff and members of the performance department to Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands.
Every loan player would undergo detailed physical and technical testing.
Their training plans would then be tailored individually.
Strength.
Mobility.
Acceleration.
Body composition.
First touch.
Passing.
Defensive positioning.
Finishing.
Whichever areas needed work would be addressed through programmes agreed between Newton Heath and the partner club.
The process would not stop once the player left England.
New Manchester United scouts would attend matches.
Video would be collected.
Performance reports would be returned to the club.
The receiving team's coaches would remain responsible for the player day to day, but Newton Heath would continue to track his development.
Most importantly, the loans were being designed around actual squad needs.
"We don't want Benfica asking us for a striker and sending them a defensive midfielder because that's the player we happen to need minutes for," Villas-Boas said.
"If Genk need a centre-back, we send a centre-back."
"If Ajax need a central midfielder, we send a central midfielder."
"That way the player is useful to them immediately."
"And they've committed to giving the players genuine opportunities?"
"Yes."
No sensible club would promise an automatic starting place regardless of form.
But all three partners had agreed to provide meaningful pathways.
If the players performed, they would play.
That was the important part.
The better the player became, the more the partner club benefited.
The incentives were aligned.
Ethan leaned back.
The model reminded him of other alliances he remembered from European football.
Some had worked well.
Others had collapsed because one club treated the other as little more than storage.
Chelsea's relationship with PSV Eindhoven was a good example of how resentment could grow.
Chelsea had acquired Alex in Brazil and placed him at PSV, where the defender became one of the Dutch club's most important players.
Yet when the time came to bring him to England, PSV had almost no control over the outcome and received little meaningful compensation for years spent developing him.
The sporting benefit had been real.
The long-term partnership suffered.
Ethan had no interest in reproducing that model.
If Benfica spent two years developing a New Manchester United player who became worth £20 million, Benfica deserved something more than a thank-you.
That principle was already built into the agreements.
Villas-Boas's plan undoubtedly involved accumulating a large number of talented players.
There was no point pretending otherwise.
But the distinction lay in what happened afterwards.
Real Madrid hoarded talent.
Barcelona did.
Manchester United did.
Arsenal did.
Chelsea, Milan and Juventus did too.
Every major club tried to control promising players before their prices became enormous.
The real question was whether those players were given a route to develop.
Ethan had seen too many gifted youngsters spend years sitting behind established stars because a famous club did not want to sell them but also had no place to play them.
Gerard López was only one example.
A player could lose some of the most important years of his career that way.
New Manchester United's approach was supposed to avoid that.
A prospect might belong contractually to the club.
That did not mean he had to remain physically in Manchester.
If Benfica could give him forty serious matches, that was better than ten reserve appearances at Newton Heath.
If Ajax could teach him to operate in a demanding technical system, that could be better still.
If Genk could give a young African player his first stable season in European football, the experience could change his career.
And if, after two or three years, the player was not good enough for New Manchester United?
Then he could move elsewhere as a developed professional rather than as a forgotten academy prospect.
Ethan considered that especially important for South American and African players.
Moving directly from a modest club or youth system into the dressing room of the European champions sounded glamorous.
In reality, it could be destructive.
The speed of the game was different.
The tactics were different.
The culture was different.
The language might be different.
The weather certainly was.
Then came the pressure of competing against some of the best players in the world for a place.
For many young players, an intermediate step was healthier.
Portugal.
The Netherlands.
Belgium.
Competitive leagues with strong development cultures, European competition and less suffocating pressure.
A place to make mistakes.
A place to play.
A place to become ready.
Ethan closed the report.
What had begun years earlier as a list of names he was afraid of forgetting had evolved into something much larger.
New Manchester United were no longer simply scouting young talent.
They were beginning to build an international development network around it.
And if Villas-Boas was right, the club might have found a way to do something Europe's biggest teams had struggled with for decades.
Not merely collect talented players.
Actually develop them.
(To be continued.)